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When the Robinson-Patman Act became a law approximately ten
years ago,1 questions arose concerning both its constitutionality and its
practical workability, due to the absence therefrom of specific guides of
prohibited and permissible action. The constitutionality of the Act
has long since been decided. 2 Many practical difficulties in applying
the Act to specific situations still exist, however, despite the many guides
for action now educible from the decisions of the courts. This fact
received recent judicial recognition in the comment of Judge Lindley
in United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.3
"I doubt if any judge would assert that he knows exactly what does
or does not amount to violation of the Robinson-Patman Act in
any and all instances."
Apparently, the Supreme Court has been mindful of this fact having
already given consideration to two cases arising under the Act 4 and,
more recently, having consented to hear an additional case 5 while
denying certiorari in three cases which presented no outstanding points
of novel interest. 6
tB.A., 1911, LL:B., 1935, Fordham University, General Motors Corporation,
Member of the Detroit Bar.
i. The Robinson-Patman Act, 49 STAT. 1526-1528 (Q936), 15 U. S. C. §§ 13, 13a,
13b, 21a (I94O), became law June 19, 1936, although 52 STAT. 446 (1938), 15 U. S.' C.
§ 13c, exempting non-profit institutions became a law May 26, 1938.
2. The basic justification for the Act on constitutional grounds advanced by the
Congressional proponents thereof was Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553,
597 (1936), affirming United States v. Sugar Institute, 15 F. Supp. 817 (1934), in
which the Supreme Court indicated that discriminations in price between the customers
of the type subsequently covered by the Robinson-Patman Act might well be prohibited
by Congress under its interstate commerce powers.--8o CONG. REc. 8223 (1936).
3. 67 F. Supp. 626, 677 (E. D. Ill. 1946).
4. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726
(1945) ; Staley Manufacturing Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 746
(1945).
5. In Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 S. (2d) 461 (1945)
the Florida Supreme Court held in an action on a promissory note for a cancelled purchase by defendant that the defense that the sale constituted a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act was not available under the evidence. Petition for certiorariwas
filed September 5, 1945, and cert. granted November 13, 1945, 326 U. S. 711, affirmed.
by an equally divided court February 11, 1946, 327 U. S. 758, rehearing granted, case
restored to docket for reargument before full bench and motion to withhold issuance
of mandate granted March, 1946, 327 U. S. 812.
6. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 15o F. (2d) 607 (C. C. A.
4th, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 774 (1945) ; Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus
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It is timely, therefore, to consider some of the practical questions
which not uncommonly arise under the Act, more specifically, certain
significant phases of Section 2 (a) through (f) 7 on given pricing
practices.
While the court in the recent A & P case expressed doubt that
there ever was any need for the addition of the Robinson-Patman Act
to existing anti-trust statutes,' the Act was designed to make more
effective the previously existing restrictions against price discriminations. This end was sought by more precisely refraining Section 2 of
the Clayton Act so as to limit quantity discounts and protect competitors individually as well as competition generally 8' (Section 2
(a)), by imposing the burden of justification on the person violating
Blass Co., i5o F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 8th, I945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 773 (1945) ;
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 148 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945),
cert. denied, 326 U. S. 734 (1945), rehearing denied, 326 U. S. 809 (945).
7. No proceeding has as yet been undertaken under Section 3 of the Act, the socalled "Borah-Van Nuys Act," which was enacted with and as a part of the
Robinson-Patman Act [49 STAT. 1528 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13a (1940) ], which is a
criminal statute. In the recent A. & P. prosecution, cited supra note 3, that company's
conviction of price discrimination was under the Sherman Act, although proceedings
might also have been taken under the Robinson-Patman Act.
8. The court said in the recent A. & P. case, United States v. New York Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 676 (E. D. Ill. 1946).
"Sometimes I doubt whether we ever needed the Robinson-Patman law, with
all its elusive uncertainty. I have thought that the Sherman Act, properly interpreted and administered, would have remedied all the ills meant to be cured. .. ."
8a. Section 2 (a) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a) (194o),
reads as follows:
"(a) That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either
or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States
or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or
other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where the effect of
such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein
contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered:
Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and
revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of
commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities are so
few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be
construed to permit differentials based on differences in quantities greater than
those so fixed and established: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares or merchandise in
commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions
affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but
not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence
of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned."
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the Act (Section 2 (b)),9 by making receipt of price discriminations
unlawful (Section 2 (f)),10 and by specifically forbidding three trade
practices which were deemed inevitably injurious to competition: the
granting of a fictitious brokerage fee or any allowance in lieu thereof
11
to the other party to the transaction or his agent (Section 2 (c)),
the making of discriminatory payments by the seller to the buyer for
services rendered by the latter (Section 2 (d) ),12 and discrimination
by the seller in the rendering of services to the buyer (Section 2 (e) ).13
Quite pragmatically, the first concern of the businessman is the
sanction or sanctions attaching to a failure to abide by the provisions
9. Section 2 (b) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), i5 U. S. C. § 13 (b) (i94O),
reads as follows:
"Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that

there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished, the bur-

den of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be
upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and unless justification
shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized to issue an order
terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, that nothing contained in
sections 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 of this title shall prevent a seller rebutting the primafacie case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services

or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an

equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor."
io. Section 2 (f) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1527 (936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (f) (940),
reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which
is prohibited by this section."
II. Section 2 (c) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), I5 U. S. C. § 13 (c) (940),
reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a
commission, brokerage or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to
an agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary
is acting in fact for or in behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, of
any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation
is so granted or paid."
15 U. S. C. § 13 (d) (194o)
12. Section 2 (d) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1527 (936),
reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce.to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer of
such person in the course of such commerce as compensation or in consideration
for any services or facilities furnished by or through such customer in connection
with the processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of any products or commodities manufactured, sold, or offered for sale by such person, unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally equal -terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or commodities."
13. Section 2 (e) of the Act, 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (e) (194o),
reads as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale,
with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing,
handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms
not accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms." See Oliver Bros.
v. Federal Trade Commission, 1O2 F. (2d) 763, 767 (C. C. A. 4th. '1939).
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of the Robinson-Patman Act. Not only are there the penalties provided by the Act itself but, as the court pointed out in the A ,& P
case, the penalties of the Sherman Act may also be brought to bear
upon one violating the Act, namely, a $5,000 fine or imprisonment
for one year or both. 14 The Robinson-Patman Act itself also provides (in Section 3) for a penalty of a $5,000 fine or, in the alternative,
one year's imprisonment, 15 although no action has as yet been taken
under this section. In addition, however, there are four other types
of effect which the Act may have upon the businessman who violates
its provisi6ns: The Federal Trade Commission may proceed against
the party violating the Act; 16 the injured party may institute action
against the discriminating seller for triple damages; 17 the injured party
or the local U. S. District Attorney under the direction of the AttorneyGeneral may obtain injunctive relief ' 8 -and it is important to note
that an officer or agent of the seller is equally liable with the seller; 19
or the person involved in a discriminatory contract "may seek to avoid
the contract. 20 The last of these sanctions may require a word of
explanation.
It may be that a seller and purchaser will enter into a contract
which quotes prices which are in fact (rather than expressly by the
contract) discriminatory as compared with the prices given by the
seller to his other customers. Such a contract is not invalid per se,
but is merely collateral to a practice prohibited by the statute. Conse14. 26 STAT. 2O9 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § I (1940). In the A. & P. case, the defendants were prosecuted and convicted only under the Sherman Act. No charges were
brought directly under the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act.
15. Any individual, whether acting in his own right or as a representative of a
corporation, who is a party to a transaction or contract which is in violation of Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act is legally liable therefor by reason of Section 14 of
the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §:24 (940).
16. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 21 (940) : "Authority to enforce compliance with sections 13 . . . of this title by the persons respectively subject thereto
is hereby vested . . . in the Federal Trade Commission.
.
17. 38 STAT. 731 (914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (940), gives the injured party a right

to an action for triple damages as follows:
"That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
I8. 38 STAT. 737 (914), 15 U. S. C. §26 (194o).
1g. See Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F.
Supp. 728 (W. D. Ky. 194), dffd. 136 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943). A power
company sued Fitch, its former president, for accepting and defendant company and
Potter, an officer of defendant company, for paying commissions to such president on
coal purchased by the Power Company from defendant.
2o. The essential reason for avoiding the contract would be that there is no legal
consideration therefor or that an illegal consideration is an essential part of the whole
consideration. Bruce's Juices v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 S. (2d) 461
(945) ; Gross Bros. Flour Co. v. International Milling Co., C. C. H. Trade Reg. Serv.
(9th ed.) 1"57,262 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
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quently, it is enforceable either in a suit by the seller for the payment
of drafts accepted by the purchaser covering the commodities sold or in
21
an action for the balance of the purchase price.
On the other hand, a seller and a purchaser may be parties to a
contract which provides for an act violative per se 'of the RobinsonPatman Act, for example, a contract providing for payment of unlawful rebates.2 2 Such a contract is absolutely void and unenforceable
and the valid provisions thereof cannot be considered as severable from
the illegal provision for rebates, since the latter provision would constitute an essential part of the consideration and the contract in its severed
state would therefore, lack mutuality.2 3 In such a case, nevertheless, a
seller could evidently recover for goods already sold and delivered on a
24
quantum valebat basis.
If, however, the contract between the seller and purchaser provided
solely for the payment of a fee by the seller to a broker acting for the
purchaser, the contract would not only be void and unenforceable as
to future services, but no recovery would be permissible even on a
quantum meruit basis for past services supplied thereunder. 25 This
would be true, even though the broker might have performed substantial services for the seller, since the primary and essential services
furnished by the broker would have been performed for the purchaser
whose position is of its very nature adverse to that of the seller so that
no legal consideration for a brokerage fee could possibly be given by
the broker to the seller. The interdiction of Section 2 (c) renders payment of a brokerage fee under the circumstances illegal per se and
absolutely void as against public policy.2 6
Turning from the sanctions attaching to violations of the Act to
the substantive provisions of the Act, it will undoubtedly be found most
convenient to consider Section 2 (a) first and then, in turn, Sections
2 (c), (d) and (e).
An analysis of Section 2 (a) shows that five elements must be
present in an act which violates the provisions of the section. There
must be a sale of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce for
use or resale in the United States. There must be two or more purchasers from the same seller. The commodity involved in the sales
21. Bruce's juice v. American Can Co., 155 Fla. 877, 22 S. (2d) 461 (1945), cited
supra note 5; cf. Gross Bros. Flour Co. v. International Milling Co., C. C. H. Trade
Reg. Serv. (9th ed.) 1 57,262 (S. D. N. Y. I944).
22. Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 131 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
23. Id. at 676.
24. Penn-Allen Cement Co. v. Phillips & Sutherland, 182 N. C. 437, lO9 S. E. 257
(1921).
25.

Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Comm., 1I4 F. (2d) 398 (C. C.

A. ist, I94O).

26. See discussion of Section 2 (c), infra, page 333.
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to the two purchasers must be of like grade and quality. There must
be a discrimination in the price of such commodity as between the two
purchasers. There must be probability of injury to competition or to
a competitor.
In connection with the commerce requirement, the important question arises: Does the Act cover a discriminatory sale which takes
place wholly within a state? This is a problem of vital interest to the
local businessman and also to the large corporation doing both an interstate and intrastate business.
The commerce requirement of Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act is as follows:
it

. . .itshall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce,
in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to
discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality, where either or any of the purchases
involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any
insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the
United States . .
It will be observed, therefore, that first the seller must be engaged
in commerce, that is, in interstate or foreign commerce on the basis of
27
the applicable definition of "commerce" set forth in the Clayton Act.
In addition, there must be a discrimination by the seller which involves
a sale of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce.
From these concepts it follows that an injured purchaser or seller
need not be in interstate commerce in order to have rights against another seller who discriminates with respect to sales made by such other
seller in interstate commerce. This was made manifest in Midland Oil
Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co. 28

There, the plaintiff suing for treble

damages was an Illinois corporation buying gasoline from another Illinois corporation and distributing the same to its customers in the City
of Chicago. The plaintiff had no contractual relations whatsoever with
the defendant, which distributed gasoline in interstate commerce at
discriminatory prices to one of plaintiff's purchasers. The court held
that the plaintiff had a cause of action. The test applied was simply
this: If a seller is engaged in interstate commerce and discriminates
between two of his purchasers, thereby damaging another seller, the
latter has a cause of action under the Act. If this test is applied, then
27. Section i of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (I914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 (1940).
28.

41 F. Supp. 436 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
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apparently the same conclusion would likewise follow even if a discriminatory sale made by a seller generally engaged in selling in interstate commerce were to originate and be consummated wholly within
one state. For the Act does not require that both sales by a discriminating seller be in commerce, but only that "either or any of the purchases
involved" be in commerce. In contrast, however, a seller who is engaged wholly in intrastate commerce is immune from the Act as respects discriminatory intrastate sales since the seller is not "engaged
in commerce" within the meaning of the Act.
Even if the seller is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce
and makes a discriminatory sale in such commerce, the sale may
nevertheless be outside the coverage of the Act if the item sold is not
sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States. Sales,
for example, by a company located in the United States to foreign purchasers are immune from the Act since the commodities o sold are
not for use in the United States.2 9 Yet purchases by such a company
from foreign sellers are subject to the Act if the commodities purchased
are to be used, consumed or resold within the United States.3 0 Obviously, only where the commodity sold is to be used, consumed or resold
in the United States would a discrimination have an adverse effect on
the domestic competitive situation which Congress desired to safeguard.
With respect to the second stated requisite for a violation of Section 2 (a), that there be two purchasers from the same seller, the
. to disstatute says that "it shall be unlawful for any person .
criminate in price between different purchasers. . . " It is on the
basis of this language that it is concluded that the two purchasers must
buy from the same person since only the one person (i. e., a discriminating seller) is mentioned in the section and the words "two
purchasers" which are necessarily correlative in that they imply a
seller, could not, therefore, grammatically, relate back to any person
other than the discriminating seller.
In the recent case of Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Commission,3 ' the point was referred to obliquely. The petitioners
expressed an apprehension that the Federal Trade Commission order
issued against them in respect of Section 2 (e) might compel them to
accord demonstriator services on proportionally equal terms to retail
stores which acquired Arden products from so-called bootlegging
sources, thus raising the question whether the word "purchasers" 'in
29. 80 CONG. REc. 6582 (1936).
30. United States v. N. Y. Amsterdamsche Chininefabrick, consent decree (S. D.
N. Y., Sept. 1928), 3 C. C. H. Fed. Trade Reg. Serv. f[3317 (1928) (applying the earlier section 2 of the Clayton Act).
31. 156 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
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Section 2 (e) might not be broad enough to include any purchasers
of the commodity involved, rather than only direct purchasers from a
discriminating seller. As the question was held not to have arisen in
the proceedings before the Commission, the court construed the Federal
Trade Commission order as not intended to cover allowances to such
indirect purchasers, but specifically stated, by way of footnote, that the
court did not consider the question whether persons buying from "bootleggers" are "purchasers" within the meaning of subsection 2 (e) of
the Act. It may be observed, in any event, that the words "purchaser"
and "purchasers" as used in Section 2 (e) are somewhat different in
context and might have been intended to convey a broader meaning
than the use of the word "purchasers" in Section 2 (a).32
With regard to the requirement that there must be two purchasers
from the same seller, two significant questions arise: Can a seller or
buyer avoid the Act by reason of the separate corporate identity of its
various operations? Can a seller avoid the Act by selling to one purchaser at a given price and by refusing to sell to a competitive customer
except at a discriminatory price?
The first inquiry arises chiefly in the case of a large enterprise
doing business through various corporate subsidiaries. A large enterprise, for example, in order to achieve most efficient distribution may
be in the position of distributing different lines of its products through
different subsidiaries and yet each line may include many identical
items. Each of the subsidiaries may sell its respective line at different
prices to its own set of purchasers who, in turn, however, may, in some
instances, be in substantial competition with purchasers from the other
subsidiary. Perhaps it is unsound business practice for two subsidiaries
of the same corporation thus to sell an identical item at two different
prices; nevertheless, the situation, it will be found, probably is the result of the differing impact of competitive forces upon each of the subsidiary corporations. Will the separate corporate identity of each of
the subsidiaries protect them and their parent corporation in the circumstances from a charge of selling to competitive customers of the subsidiaries at different prices ?
If the customers have the practical opportunity to buy from either
subsidiary, there is, of course, no problem, since there is then no discrimination. The problem exists only if one set of customers are per32. Section 2 (e), 49 STAT. 1527 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (e) (1940), provides in
this respect that:
"That it shall be unlawful lor any person to discriminate in favor of one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale
. . . by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to the furnishing of, any services or facilities . . . upon terms not accorded to all purchasers
on proportionally equal terms."
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mitted to buy only from one subsidiary and at a higher price than that
which is available to customers of the other subsidiary.
From the decisions of the Federal Trade Commission, it would
appear that purchasers from various of the wholly owned subsidiaries
of a corporatibn will be treated as purchasers from one and the same
seller.3 8

. This

is probably due to the presumed existence of a common

purpose, policy and control with respect to the wholly owned subsidiaries of a corporation akin to that which exists with respect to
the operating divisions of a corporation. If this reasoning is adopted,
it may be deduced therefrom that the Federal Trade Commission will
go beyond legal identity and look at the competitive identity of interest.
The point under consideration was neither specifically remarked
upon nor decided in the cited cases, however, and it is suggested that
the sounder reasoning under the language of the Act, would save the
subsidiary companies and their parent corporation from a charge of
price discrimination on the basis of the facts proposed; since the competitive customers of each subsidiary are not in fact buying from the
same seller, i. e., the same legal entity, which in legal contemplation
must be the accepted meaning of the words "the same seller," particularly in view of the wording of the statute as previously considered. It
can by no means be concluded, however, that this is the reasoning that
would prevail, particularly in view of the consideration given in the
A & P case to the corporate device adopted by one of A & P's suppliers
at A & P's behest to escape the impact of Section 2 (c) of the Robinson34
Patman Act forbidding fictitious brokerage fees.
The court did not state whether this practice on the part of the
United States Products Corporation was illegal per se. Neither did
the court find that the A & P was guilty of restraining trade merely
because the A & P made the United States Products Corporation set
up a separate corporation for brokerage sales so that it might have the
benefit of cost savings from the United States Products Corporation
doing business exclusively as a direct seller.
In the event, however, that the separate incorporation of an enterprise's activities, whether engaged in selling or buying, constitutes
part of a system or combination in restraint of trade, it will, of course,
as in the A & P case, come within the interdiction of the Sherman
anti-trust law.
If it is arguable whether two separate corporations, affiliated
through ownership by the same parent corporation, may sell the same
C.

33. Caradine Hat Co., 39 F. T. C. 5151 (1944); Sherwin-Williams Co. 36 F. T.
(1943) ; U. S. Rubber Co., 28 F. T. C. 1489 (1939).

25

34. Cited supra note 3, at 644.
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commodity at different prices to competitive customers, it is, in contrast, quite clear that a seller may sell to its wholly owned subsidiaries
at no better prices than are offered to its independent purchasers.3 5 A
manufacturer may, of course, give preferences to its own retail outlets
which are not separately ificorporated since then there is no "sale" of
36
any kind.
The corporate aspect presents two other situations of interest
under the Act. A seller may sell at different pfices to the same purchaser, whether in the same or different section of the country unless,
of course, there is a purpose to destroy competition or a competitor or
unless another purchaser is involved.. 7 Likewise, a seller will probably be permitted to sell to two subsidiary corporations, A and B,
wholly owned by another corporation C, where A and B are located in
two different cities. A price difference in each of the factual situations
described would be permissible since, in the first case, no discrimination
between different purchasers would be involved and, in the second case,
no injurious effect on competition would ordinarily result.
The second inquiry mentioned with respect to the requirement that
two purchasers must be involved in an act violative of Section 2 (a)
was considered by the court in Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co.38
The plaintiff had sued the defendant for treble damages because the
defendant, sole manufacturer of election supplies, refused to sell to the
plaintiff with whom it had formerly dealt, although it had previously
indicated that it would do so; instead, the defendant sold solely to a
competitor of the plaintiff. The court dismissed the complaint.
On the other hand, inasmuch as the gravamen of the offense is
the probable adverse effect on competition, 39 logically the illegal act
would seem to be complete as soon as one sale was consummated and
an offer to sell at a discriminatory price was made by the seller to a
40
prospective buyer, even though a second sale was not consummated.
35. Sherwin-Williams Co., 36 F. T. C. 25 (1943).
36. Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 131 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).

37. Even if the excepted practice in question were not in violation of Section 2 (a),
it would be clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 3 of the Act, wherein it is
provided that "It shall be unlawful for any person, engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce . . . to sell or contract to sell goods in any part of the United
States at prices lower than those exacted by said person elsewhere in the United States
for the purpose of destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor in such part of
the United States; or, to sell, or contract to sell, goods at unreasonably low prices for
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor."
38. 105 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).

39. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 324 U. S. 726 (945).
40. Such an inference may be drawn from the Shaws' case, cited note 38 .rupra,
where the court said at page 334 of its opinion:
"Since no goods or commodities were offered to the appellant, the terms of
the subsection are not met." (Italics ours.)

316

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

And although a seller has full' liberty to choose his customers, this
liberty is not an unrestricted freedom and can be exercised only "in
bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade."4 1
The third element necessary for a violation of Section 2 (a), as
previously analyzed, is that the commodities involved in different sales
be of "like grade and quality." What, then, are "commodities" aid
to what extent does this word cut down the applicability of the Section?
In the classic legal sense, the term "commodities in commerce" has
always included only things such as merchandise and not services such
as insurance 42 or, apparently by the same token, financing. 43 Despite
both this limitation of the word "commodity," and the fact that the
Robinson-Patman Act applies only to price discriminations in regard
to "commodities of like grade and quality" the Act probably would be
held to apply to services used in or in connection with interstate commerce. Hence, discriminatory prices in insurance, financing, or any
similar service might be subject to the Act. The price of the services
could be tied in with the related commodities, so as to make the latter
the "commodities" in respect of which the discrimination is effected
in order to satisfy the requirement of the Act; 44 or the service itself,
because of its inextricable tie-in with commodities in interstate commerce could itself be deemed an integral part of such commodities. 45
Directing attention, however, to the term "commodities" in its
more usual sense, an analysis of the cases and of the Federal Trade
Commission decisions supports the description of "commodities of like
grade and quality" as commodities designed for the same end purpose
and substantially the same (although superficially different) in design,
constituents and construction. This is in keeping with the language
of the statute which was calculated to embrace evasive practices obtaining with respect to the manufacture and sale to different purchasers
41. Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Comm., 114 F. (2d) 393 (C. C.
A. Ist, 194o); Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., iog F. (2d) 268 (C. C.
A. 5th, 194o); Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., io6 F.
(2d) 667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (I939), rehearing denied,%
309 U. S. 694 (1940) ; Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Comm., 102 F. (2d) 763 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1939) ; Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 96 F. (2d) 687 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938).
42. Stone, C. J., dissenting in South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U. S.
533, 570-574 (1944).

43. Cf., however, United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F. (2d) 376
(C. C. A. 7th, x941), cert. denied, 314 U. S. 618, rehearing denied, 314 U. S. 71o, and
General Motors Corporation et al. v. Federal Trade Comm., 114 F. (2d) 33, 36 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied, 312 U. S. 682.
44. United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A. 7th,
1941). Where the Sherman Act rather than the Robinson-Patman Act was involved,
but the point above made is equally applicable.
45. Black, J., writing for the 4-3 majority in South-Eastern Underwriters, 322
U. S. 533 (1944).
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under different special brand names of substantially the same commodity

46

An important and interesting exception t6 the foregoing definition
occurs, however, where a commodity, which is of like grade and quality to another commodity, is sold in combination with a third commodity. There the combination has been held to change the grade
and quality of the first commodity in relation to the second. In
Package Closure v. Sealright the complaint alleged that the defendant
sold milk bottle cap-and-hood combinations at unreasonably low prices,
thus discriminating between customers who bought hoods from the defendant and those who bought hoods from the plaintiff, which did not
sell caps. The Court of Appeals for the second circuit held that such
a complaint did not allege a price discrimination in violation of the
47
Robinson-Patman Amendment to the Clayton Act.
The Package Closure holding in this respect does not seem logical
or sound law, however, since first, as Frank, J., pointed out by way of
dissent : 48
. . . there were sales of caps to those who purchased them in
combination with hoods at prices which discriminated against
those who purchased caps only. In both instances, the same product, caps, were actually sold."
And second, it is illegal under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the tying-in
prohibition, to sell an item to a customer on condition that he must
buy another in combination therewith or to extend to him special terms
in consideration of his buying a second such item. 49
What practical guides, then, it may be inquired, are there for determining whether or not two articles are of "like grade"?
The question is particularly pertinent in view of the fact that a
manufacturer, by reason of the very definition of "grade," may in good
faith consider two similar articles, even of approximately the same
46. U. S. Rubber Co., 28 F. T. C. 1489 (1939). See Bagley, Four Years Under
the Robinson-Patman Act (1941) 25 MINN. L. Rrv. 131.
47. Package Closure Corp. v. Sealright Co., I4I F. (2d). 972, 979-980 (C. C. A.
2d, I944).
48. Id. at 98o.
49. Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 731 (914), I5 U. S. C. § 14 (r940),
provides :
o"...
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course
of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods . . . for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States . . . or fix a price charged
therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition . . . that
the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale or
contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
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quality, to be of different grades and charge different prices- therefor.
"Grade" is defined by Webster as "a class constituted by things having the same relative position or standing. . .

."

It follows that two

similar articles, even when they are of approximately the same quality,
may not have the same relative position or standing in the eyes of the
buying public so that as a result one article might have a better extrinsic value than another and, therefore, command a better price. For
example, if a manufacturer makes two products of the same type and
quality and attaches his own trade name or a warranty to one so that
by reason thereof it commands a better price than the- other, it may
be assumed that the manufacturer has acted in good faith in placing
the selected product in a higher grade and establishing a higher price
therefor. Where advertising or warranty service has added to the connotation of reliability of the selected product, an element of cost justification for the different prices of the two grades will also exist.
It must be recognized, of course, that whether all merchandise of
the same kind and of substantially the same quality is of the same
grade is a question of fact. It has been held, for example, that two
-commodities of substantially the same constituents and performing the
same end purpose, but bearing different private brand names, are of
"like grade and quality" within the comprehension of the RobinsonPatman Act.5 0 The position that two commodities are not of the same
grade can be more easily supported, therefore, accordingly as the differences in constituents and construction are greater. No rule of thumb
can be laid down in the latter respect.
From what has been said, it likewise follows that all customers of
a particular seller who buy private brand merchandise of the same
grade and quality, that is, merchandise which is substantially the same
in constituents, construction and end purpose, must be given the same
prices, discounts, and allowances in respect of such merchandise, even
though the merchandise sold to each customer bears a different brand
51
name or no name at all.
The fourth element involved in an act violative of Section 2 (a)
is the element of price discrimination, and in this respect the Act prohibits direct as well as indirect price discriminations.
50. United States v. Rubber Co., 28 F. T. C. 1489 (1939).

5i. See remarks of Mr. Teegarden in his opinion of the House Hearings on the
Act, Hearings Before Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., :2d Sess.
(1936) 469:
"Under the Patman bill as it stands, manufacturers are still free to put up
their products under private brands; but if they do so for one purchaser under his
private brand, then they must be ready to do so on the same terms, relative to
their comparative costs, for a competing purchaser under his private brand; and
unless that equality of treatment is required and assured, the discriminations at.
which the bill is aimed cannot be suppressed."
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The term "discrimination in price, direct or indirect" has been
held applicable not only in the case of simple, direct price discriminations, as where a seller charges one purchaser $5 for a commodity and
another purchaser $io for the same commodity, but also to such indirect discriminations as freight, discrimination in the terms of sale or
other allowances, 52 or the privilege of returning unsold items.53 In
other words, the term "price" as used in the Act "takes into account
all discounts, rebates, allowances, and other terms and conditions of.
sale" which manifestly are the equivalent of a price discrimination.5 4
In the Corn Productscase 5 that company was charged with violation of Section 2 (a) because it utilized a basing point system pursuant
to which all its customers paid freight on glucose purchased fronf the
Company on the basis of the freight rate from Chicago to the place of
business of the respective customer, whether the glucose was actually
shipped from the Company's Chicago plant or from its Kansas City
plant. All the customers involved used the glucose in manufacturing
candy and regardless of the part of the country in which they were
variously located, such customers were in competition with one another.
Depending on the destination point, the Company's use of this Chicago
basing point system meant the payment by customers served from
Kansas City of a "phantom'' or fictitious freight charge of from 4 to
40 cents per hundredweight of glucose or from 2% to I9% of the
Chicago base price. Since glucose was found to constitute from 5%
to 95% of the candy products manufactured by the petitioners' customers, and since, due to the low prices of such candy products, it was
further found that even a fraction of a cent difference in the manufacturing costs incurred by such customers was sufficient to injure
competition, the "phantom" freight charged by the company on Kansas
City shipments was deemed to be a price discrimination in violation of
Section 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act.
In view of the prolific discussion that has arisen since the Corn
Products decision with respect to the legality of various basing point
systems, it is very important to note, however, that the Supreme Court
did not condemn basing point systems per se as violations of Section
2 (a), but only when two elements are present, to wit: a price discrimination between customers and a probable injury to competition."
52.

Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726

(1945).

53. Agricultural Laboratories, Inc., 26 F. T. C. 296 (1938).
54. Standard Oil Co., F. T. C. No. 4389 (Dec. 10, 1945).
55. 324 U. S. 726 (i945), cited supra note

56. Id. at 737.

52.
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On the other hand, in the companion case of Federal Trade Comm.
v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. the court said:
"But it does not follow that respondents may never absorb freight
when their factory price plus actual freight is higher than their
competitor's price or that sellers, by so doing, may not maintain
a uniform delivered price at all points of delivery, for in that event
there is no discriminationin price." (Italics ours.) 57
In other words, uniform pricing of commodities is not of itself a
violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The same is true of a basing
point system. Whether or not a violation exists depends upon the
probability of injury to competition. Thus, a uniform price system
under which prices are the same in a given area, but different as compared with other areas may be illegal because of the impact of higher
prices on customers in a higher price area who are in competition with
those in a lower price area. No such possible injury to competition will
result, however, in the case of a national uniform delivered price which
results in a "uniform delivered price at all points of delivery, for in
that event there is no discrimination in price." This distinction will
serve to clarify and reconcile the statement in the Corn Products case
that a uniform delivered price system is not illegal per se, implying
that it might be illegal, depending upon particular circumstances, and
the statement in the Staley case in respect to a system of uniform delivered prices at all points which, of itself, is legal.
Confirmation of the foregoing explanation is found in the recent
case of Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.j 8 where
the court overruled the Federal Trade- Commission's "cease and desist'?
order restraining 74 cement producers from the use of a multiple bas'ing point system in the marketing of cement. The Commission had
charged that the cement producers associated in the Cement Institute
had combined and agreed to use a multiple basing point system of
pricing, resulting in the quotation of an identical delivered price by all
producers at any given destination allegedly in violation of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Mill A with a basing point
at Town A, the Commission charged, when going into Town C for
business, absorbed freight, a very substantial factor in the final delivered price of cement in order to compete with Mill C; likewise, Mill C
with a basing point at Town C, in competing with Mill A in Town A,
absorbed freight and sold at the same delivered prices as Mill A;
finally, Mill B located in Town B, which B determined would be a
non-basing point, adopted the freight charges of either A, or C.
57. 324 U. S. 746, 757 (1945).
58. 157 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946).
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In contrast, however, the "phantom" freight charged .by Mill B
was found to be in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act. The court
concluded in this respect:
"Undoubtedly this constitutes a discrimination against its customers in those towns and is a violation of Sec. 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Corn Products
Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S.726 . .. , and
Federal Trade Commission v. Staley, 324 U. S. 746 • •., and the
Commission could proceed against Mill B and all others engaging
in a similar practice." 59
It will be observed that a national uniform price system and certain other pricing systems which do not reflect true freight cost to the
seller involve economic discriminations.00 The Federal Trade Commission so argued in its findings in the Cement case."1
Followed to its ultimate conclusion, the economic theory and reasoning of the Federal Trade Commission in the Cement case as first
advanced by the Commission in the "Pittsburgh Plus" proceeding
against U. S. Steel in 1924 62 would mean that competition by industry on a national scale would be substantially curtailed. An industry
would not be permitted to include in its initial basic price any cost
factors, principally transportation, attributable only to portions of its
business emanating at distant points. At such points other local industries would control the market and, by the same token, would not
be able to compete in distant points. This would mean the fostering
by the government of local competitive industry and the limitation of
large national competitive industries which have been one of the most
63
notable factors in our industrial progress.
59. Id. at 558.

6o. Sharp, Cost Discrimination and the Robinson-Patman Act (1938) 5 U. oF
CHI. L. REv. 383; Withrow, Basing-Pointand Freight-Zone Price Systems Under the
Anti-Trust Laws (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 69o; FE-rma, THE MASQUERADE OF
MONOPOLY ('93').

61. The Court answers this argument at I57 F.(2d) 533, 56o (C. C. A. 7th, 1946):
"The finding [of the Commission] continues: 'Each mill shrinks its mill net
by the amount necessary for it to match the delivered prices established pursuant to
the aforesaid pricing system.' This is high sounding language, perhaps consistent
with economic thinking, but in reality it means nothing more or less than that
each mill reduces its mill net by the amount necessary to enable it to meet the
delivered price of a competitor in territory where it is at a disadvantage freightwise."
.62. Federal Trade Comm. v. U. S. Steel Corporation, 8 F. T. C. I (1924). See
Sharp, Discriminationand the Robinson-PatinanAct (1938) 5 U. OF CHi.L. REV. 383.
For fuller exposition of the Federal Trade Commission theory, by its apparent progenitor, a witness for the Commission in the U. S. Steel proceeding, see FE=TR, THE
MASQUERADE OF MONOPOLY (1931).

63. The court took cognizance of this situation in the Aetna Portland Cement case,
cited supra note 58, at 563:
". . .One of its favorite themes is that the basing point system operates to
nullify the natural advantages and disadvantages of location of the respective mills
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The Cement Institute decision furthef enunciated the fact first set
forth in the Supreme Court's dictum in the Staley case: 64 that the
economic discriminations inherent in a pricing system are not necessarily illegal discriminations, a point most important for the lawyer to
discern in analyzing the legality of any given pricing system. Such
economic discriminations are illegal only when they adversely affect
competition, that is, one purchaser's ability to sell his products on an
equal price basis with his competitor. 65
The Supreme ,Court's dictum in the Staley case translated to the
language of the economist, means, for example, that a seller may total
outgoing freight costs on finished products shipped to customers (just
as he does incoming freight costs on original production materials),
add his total production costs- and desired profit margin, and arrive
at a uniform delivered price equally applicable to all competitive customers since, despite the resultant economic discrimination against customers located nearest to his plant, in that situation, legally, there would
be no discrimination in price; and the decision in the Cement Institute
case, further clarifying the seller's right with regard to pricing, means
that a seller has the right to set his own basic price and to absorb
freight in order to meet competition in good faith, although with consequent reduction of his net yield and resultant indirect discrimination
against customers nearest his plant, rather than being required to subtract the amount of absorbed freight costs on his most distant shipments from his established basic price and to consider the resultant
reduced net yield as his basic price. On the basis of the court's analysis,
it may be said, that the Commission or other aggrieved party, has no
right to look into the elements making up the seller's established basic
price, although, on the other hand, the seller has no right, of course,
when quoting in a given territory. The Commission states: 'Under any kind of
pricing method every mill has a substantial and naturally inherent advantage when
quoting on nearby business in real competition with more distant mills. By the
same token every mill has a substantial and naturally inherent disadvantage when
quoting on distant business in competition with mills located nearer to the customer.' This appears to be a logical statement but the question immediately
arises as to how the Commission proposes to give effect to this 'naturally inherent
advantage' and this 'naturally inherent disadvantage.' As we have already shown,
it proposes to make supreme the advantage of a mill selling in the territory where it
has a freight advantage, and to make its disadvantage so great when selling in a
competitor's territory as to practically preclude it from entering that market. In
fact, the advantage and disadvantage would no longer be natural but artificial;
effected by the requirement th.t, each mill sell on an f. o. b. mill price. The change
from the present system to one conforming with the Commission's order would be
like jumping from the frying pan into the fire."
64. Cited supra note 57.
65. Corn Products v. Federal Trade Comm., cited note 39 supra; Federal Trade
Comm. v. Staley, cited note 57 supra. See Book Note (1931) 45 HARV. L. REv. 397;
also Withrow, Basing-Point and Freight-Zone Price System Under the Anti-Trust
Laws (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. RE~v. 69o, for review of applicable basing-point decisions
of the courts up to that time.
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to give any special discriminatory discount or markdown from such
price to particular customers as earlier considered herein. 6
Legislative cognizance has been taken of the economic discriminations inherent in many basing point systems, but no final action has
ever been taken.67 Accordingly, the court concluded in the recent
Cement case: 6s

"If this pricing system which Congress has over the years steadfastly refused to declare illegal, although vigorously urged to do
so, is now to be outlawed by the courts, it will mark the high tide
in judicial usurpation."
Significant by way of contrast with the recent Cement decision
are the decisions of the same Circuit Court in United States Malsters
Association et al. v. Federal Trade Comm., 9 and Milk and Ice Cream
Can Institute v. Federal Trade Comm.70 Of these cases, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit said in the Cement case: 71
"We need not discuss these decisions any further than to point
out that in each of those cases a conspiracy to fix prices was
charged and found. The multiple basing point price system was
not directly involved in either case. In other words, the conspiracy was to fix prices and not merely to use a system from
which uniformity of price resulted, as in the instant case and the
old Cement case."
Judge Evans in his dissenting opinion emphasized that an agreement to fix prices by use of a multiple basing point system was the
heart of the case, however, and that since the Federal Trade Commission had found sufficient evidence to support the existence of such
an agreement, it was not the function of the court to reverse the finding. It is too well recognized to need comment that any understand66. For a comparison with the Circuit Court's disposition of the economic verbiage
surrounding the situation, see the analysis of Prof. Fetter's economic concept, Book
Note (1931) 45 H v.L. REV. 395.

67. In Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., I57 F. (2d) 533 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1946) the court said at p. 573:
hl . . the basing point price sygtem has been in use by industry for almost a
half century. . . . The pages of the Congressional Record bear mute but indisputable proof of the fact that Congress has repeatedly refused to declare its use
illegal.
"In our judgment, the question as to whether the basing point price system
-should be declared illegal rests clearly within the legislative domain."
68. Ibid.
69. 152 F. (2d) I6I (C. C. A. 7th, 1945).
70. 152 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945).

71. Cited supra note 58, at

572.
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ing or agreement
which makes use of a basing point system to fix
72
prices is illegal.
The consideration given by the courts to the matter of basing
point and delivered price systems as possible means of price discriminations demonstrates at any rate the wide scope of Section 2 (a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act with respect to the meaning that will be given
to "price discriminations." The same point is evidenced also by the
fact that the Supreme Court in the Corn Products case considered
as price discriminations forbidden by Section 2 (a) the company's
"price protection" practice of permitting certain favored customers to
take delivery of glucose at the old prices, after new, higher prices were
generally in effect, as well as the company's fictitious "quantity price"
practice of permitting certain tank wagon customers to book orders
at the lower prices charged for tank car deliveries when deliveries were
actually taken by tank wagon quantities over extended periods of time
and no cost savings were therefore realized by the seller. In answer
to the contention of the petitioners that the practices were discriminations in the "terms of sale" but not in price, the court said:
". .. we cannot ignore the fact that the present discriminations
in the terms of sale operated to permit the favored customers to
purchase at a lower price than other customers so that their only
practical effect was to establish discriminations in price, precisely
the evil at which the statute was aimed." 73
The term "direct and indirect discrimination" is, therefore, broad
enough and was designed to embrace any variation of price discrimination'and any equivalent practice which might be devised to evade the
prohibition against price discrimination. 7 4
If a seller gives credit
terms to one purchaser, however, while refusing to give such terms
to another purchaser, no indirect discrimination is effected because
the two customers involved, due to the respective situation of each,
may not be entitled to the same consideration on this score. Nevertheless, if a purchaser makes payment in the same way and at the same
time as other purchasers, he is entitled to the same discount that may
be available to such other purchasers for prompt payment. 75 Significantly, the openness or secrecy surrounding a price differential will be
very important in determining its legality. If a price discrimination of
558.

72. See Note, Basing-Point Pricing and Anti-Trust Policy (1946) 55

YALE

L.

J.

73. Cited supra note 55, at 74o.
74. Bayley, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patman Act

(1941)

:25MINN. L.

REv. 131.

75. Note, The Robinson-PatinanAct in Action (1937) 46 YALE L. J.447, 463-64.
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any type is secretly given to a buyer it probably will be deemed
illegal.

76

The foregoing discussion logically suggests the question therefore:
What precisely is "discrimination"?
While the term seemingly might have been more logically considered before a discussion of the term "direct and indirect discrimination," it has been deemed preferable to consider the term "discrimination" at this point because of the competitive relationship implied by
the term. This, in turn, naturally leads to a consideration a the
various types of competitive relationships comprehended by the Act,
for the Act does not make unlawful mere differences in price between
purchasers, but only differences which amount to "discrimination." 77
An analysis demonstrates that there are two elements that exist
with respect to a prohibited price discrimination. The essential discrimination is found in the fact that two or more customers buy from the
seller the same commodity produced at the same expense to the seller
and yet pay different prices. Next, this discrimination affects the competitive relationship between these two parties, i. e., one person, whether
a buyer or a seller, is competitively injured by the discrimination.
In regard to the fifth element, the element of competitive injury
that must exist in an act violative of Section 2 (a), the Section provides that a discriminatory act or practice is proscribed "where the
effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, 'destroy or prevent competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with
customers of either of them." While injury to competing purchasers
from the same seller is most commonly involved in cases under the
Robinson-Patman Act,"8 it is not the only type of competitive injury
which may be involved in a price discrimination forbidden by the Act.
Another type is to be found in sales by a seller at discriminatory prices
to some customers (even though these are not in competition with his
other customers) where the probable effect of the discrimination may be
76. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th,

1930), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (1930) ; Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S.

553 (1936), aff'g., 15 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. N. Y. 1934) ; United States v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E. D. Ill.
1946).
77. Mr. Utterback stated in the House upon submission of the conference report on
the bill, 8o CoNG. REc. 9416 (1936):
"In its meaning as simple English a discrimination is more than a mere difference. Underlying the meaning of the word is the idea that some relationship
exists betwen the parties to the discriminationwhich entitled themn to equal treatinent, whereby the difference granted to one casts some burden or disadvantage
upon the other." (Italics ours.)
78. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, cited supra note 55.
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to injure a competing seller. 79 A variation of the latter type of competitive injury is found in the case where a seller sells at discriminatory
prices to some of his customers (even though they are not in competition with his other customers) where the effect of-the discrimination
may probably be to injure the customers of a competing seller.
It follows, therefore, that the seller who wishes to determine
whether his prices and distribution practices are in conformity with the
Robinson-Patman Act must examine to some extent the prices and
practices of his competitors as well as the effect which his acts may
have on his own customers. "
Once a competitive relationship is established and there is probability of injury to competition as a result of a discriminatory act, the
competitive factor requisite for a violation of the Act is present regardless of how far apart or how near the competitive parties may be
geographically. This was made clear by the Supreme Court in the
Corn Products case, in answering the Company's objections that its
Chicago basing point system did not violate the Act since all'purchasers
in a given locality paid exactly the same freight charges on the glucose
which they purchased.8 0
Nor is it necessary that more than one competitor; whether a
seller or a purchaser, be injured or threatened with injury by the discriminatory act. If one person is injured he will have the right to
injunctive relief and to an action for treble damages. Injury or threatened injury to several persons (that is involvement of the public interest) is the recognized requisite only for intervention by the-Federal
Trade Commission, 8 ' although even then a direct injury to one competitor may be sufficient for action by the Federal Trade Commission
if only a few competitors are engaged in the field! 82
Care is taken to use the expression "injury or threatened injury,"
it will be observed, since it is now clear that the statute does not require that the discrimination must in fact have harmed competition, but
only that there is a reasonable possibility that the discrimination practiced might have such an effect. 83 It is equally clear, of course, that
a mere possibility of injury to competition is not a sufficient basis for
a violation of the Act.8 4 The injury or threatened injury on which the
79. Samuel H. Moss., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 148 F. (2d) 378 (C. C. A. 2d,
1945), cert. denied, 66 Sup. Ct. 44, and in Midland Oil Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co.,

41 F. Supp. 436 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
8o. Cited supra note 55, at 734.
81. 38 STAT.719 (I914), amended, 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 52 STAT. Il (1938), 15
U. S. C.§45 (b) (1940).
82. Muller v. Federal Trade Commission, I42 F. (2d) 511, 520 (C.C. A. 6th,
1944).
83. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., cited note 55 supra.
84. 49 STAT. 1526 (936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (a) (194o).

EQUAL PRICE TREATMENT UNDER ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 327

violation is based must, in any event, however, be substantial whether
the injury charged is with respect to only one person or with respect
to competition generally. De minirnis non curat lex. While ordinarily
discriminations involving small amounts will not be deemed violations
of the Act, this should not be interpreted to mean that reliance can be
safely placed on figures and percentages alone. Cognizance may well
be taken of a systematic number of small discriminatory discounts, all
of which together amount to a discrimination sufficiently large to substantially injure competition or a competitor. s5 Cognizance may be
taken also of the fact that though a discrimination in and of itself is
small in amount, it may be sufficient in certain circumstances to injure
competition substantially. Thus in United States v. New York Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., the court remarked that the difference
between profitable operation and loss in the retail food business is fractional in character, so that any dealer who secured an unfair advantage over his competitors, however small it might be, would be likely
to upset or reverse a small percentage of profit in his competitor and
convert it into a loss. Accordingly, the court concluded that "when
the net profit is in the neighborhood of 2%, an advantage of 50 in
buying in one dealer immediately places him in an over-powering position so far as his competitors are concerned." 86
QUANTITY DIsCOUNTS

It is not true, nevertheless, that discriminatory discounts or prices
are always forbidden by the Act even where competition may be -injured.
Quantity discounts specifically are exempted from the application of
Section 2 (a) if justifiable on the basis of cost savings. In this regard,
the Act does not require that cost savings due to quantity production or
distribution must be passed on by the seller to the buyer, but does
require that when price differentials based on quantity are granted, they
must reflect cost savings to the seller. s A mere arbitrary allocation
or imputation of costs and savings is not permissible.8 " (Mr. Utterback in the House of Rep., after submission of conference report, 8o
CONG. tEc. 9560 (1936)).
For this reason, the purchasers of the
units of a chain store may not be bulked for purposes of granting a volume discount based on the total volume of all the units when deliveries
are made to the units and no saving to the seller in cost of delivery is
85. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
86. It follows that th&test in the final analysis is not one of numerical amount or
degree, but only of substantial effect on competition. See Corn Products Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 144 F. (2d) 211, 216 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944).
87. H. R. RF-l. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
88. Mr. Utterbach in the House of Rep., after submission of conference report, So
CoNG. Rme. 956o (1936).
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effected.8 9 Nevertheless, cost savings reflected in quantity discounts can
be indirect and approximate rather than precisely commensurate with
the price differential. 90 Items of the following type, for example, may be
considered in computing and reflecting cost savings in quantity discounts: savings in packaging costs on large orders; 91 savings in paper
and clerical work reasonably allocable to large orders; 92 savings in handling, storage, sales, and transportation expense on large orders; savings due to placing of orders long in advance; and savings in overhead reasonably related to volume purchases; 93 probably; also, the
division by the seller of his business into separatie enterprises, one of
which sells exclusively to large customers. 94
If the quantity price discount bracket is set at a point sufficiently
low to allow substantially all purchasers actually to take advantage of
it even though actually they do not so do, the quantity discount will,
of course, be justifiable since there will be neither discrimination nor
probability of injury to competition.95 Care must be taken in this connection, however, that all purchasers can actually take advantage of a
preferential price offer 91 and that purchasers are not merely ostensibly
able to take advantage of a price discount.97
The same rules that apply to ordinary quantity discounts are
equally applicable to cumulative volume discounts, that is, to discounts
based on a buyer's total purchases over a given period and granted
retroactively, although it will undoubtedly be much more difficult to
justify cumulative volume discounts than quantity discounts based on
the quantity purchased at one time since the relation of cost savings
is substantially more remote.
FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS

Like quantity discounts, certain functional discounts may be
deemed also exempt from the application of Section 2 (a) of the Act,
but.for other reasons, although the Act itself does not mention the sub89. Life Savers Corp., 34 F. T. C. 472 (1941) ; United States Rubber Co., 28 F. T.
C. 1489 (939) ; Simmons Co., 29 F. T. C. 727 (I939).
90. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936), aff'g, 15 F. Supp. 817
(S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 22 F. T. C. 232 (1936) ; Note,
"The Robinson-Patman Act in Action" (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 447, 46o.
gi. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, cited sipra note 55.
92. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
93. Ibid.
94. Smith, PatnanAct in Practice (1937) 35 MicH. L. REV. 705, 720.
95. Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-Patinan Act (1941) 25 MINN. L.
REv. 131.
96. Elizabeth Arden, Inc., et al. v. Federal Trade Commission, 156 F. (2d) 132
(C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
97. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, cited supra note 55.
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ject 9
True functional discounts will not adversely affect competition.
In addition, many functional discounts are justifiable on a cost basis.
Where a seller gives functional discounts to two really different
classes of customers who operate exclusively in different channels of
trade, no probability of injury to competition is involved. Thus, two
or more purchasers from the same seller performing entirely different
functions in respect of their purchases, such as a wholesaler selling exclusively to retailers, a retailer selling exclusively at retail, and a manufacturer using the commodity involved exclusively in the production of
a new end product and not selling the original commodity as such either
at wholesale or retail, 99 do not compete with one another. It would
likewise follow that where the facts were in line with those indicated,
the true wholesaler, being distinguished by the character of his exclusive selling in a channel of trade not competitive with that of the retailer and not by the quantity of his buying, might properly receive a
wholesale discount regardless of the quantity in which he purchased.
It is true, of course, that if a manufacturing seller gave to an exclusive wholesaler a discount disproportionate to the value of the services performed by the wholesaler so as to enable the latter to give to
retailers who purchased from him better prices than were available to
competitive retailers buying directly from the manufacturing seller, a
possible violation of the Act might occur. But, quite pragmatically, a
manufacturing seller would not be inclined to sell to wholesalers and
retailers and to give prices to those of the former class that would enable
them to destroy the seller's own competitive positiLn with respect to
his retailers. On the other hand, if special discounts to his wholesalers were necessitated by the pressure of competitive circumstances,
the seller would undoubtedly choose either to sell exclusively to wholesalers or exclusively to retailers.
The principal difficulty as respects wholesale functional discounts
arises not where the wholesaler is a true exclusive wholesaler, but
98. Klepinger, Wholesalers and the Robinson-Patinan Act (1946)

5o L. NoTEs

No. 2, 23.

99. The language of the Court in S. S. Kresge Co. v. Champion Spark Plug Co.,
3 F. (2d) 415 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925) seems applicable in this respect since the basic point
as to whether or not competition is affected was involved in that case, although Section 2 of the original Clayton Act rather than Section 2 (a) of the present RobinsonPatman Act, was the statute involved. Referring to the Clayton Act and to the granting by the seller of lower prices on its products to car manufacturers than to replacement suppliers, the court said at p. 42o:
"That Act-rightly interpreted-forbids discrimination in price between purchasers only where the effect may be unreasonably to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly, which we think is not shown to be the case here. The price of
the car to the original purchasers is presumably lessened by the low prices paid
for factory equipment. The replacement price is not necessarily thereby increased
above the normal from the mere fact that the loss incurred in providing factory
equipment must be overcome by replacement prices. The field is open to all fair
competitors."
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rather where the wholesaler does also a substantial retail business
either through his wholesale place of business or through separate retail outlets and thus competes with retailers buying from the same
manufacturing seller. Difficulty arises also when a purchaser is arbitrarily designated by a seller as a "wholesaler" or is not required by
contract with the seller to perform any distinctive distributing functions for the seller or incur any extra expenses in connection therewith as compared with the competitive retailer. It is these situations
that generally give rise to questions concerning the propriety of functional discounts. Such situations more properly come within the
sphere of the discussion regarding cost justification for functional discounts immediately following.
A demonstration of cost savings constitutes a defense to price differentials generally and is equally available as a defense when the price
differentials are designated as functional differentials. More favorable
discounts may be granted to wholesalers, for example, when such discounts are commensurate with cost savings to the seller in doing business with wholesalers who generally order in advance and with regularity and buy their stock in large quantities. Discounts or price differentials so justifiable are legal regardless of effect on competition
since they are not discriminations forbidden by the Act. 0 0
Conversely, it follows from what has been said that in cases where
wholesale prices do not reflect cost savings to the seller, a wholesaler,
who also conducts a retail business in competition with retailers, may
be granted a wholes~der's price only on those items which he buys and
resells at wholesale, and that on items resold at retail he may be
granted only the same over-all net prices as are obtainable by the retailers in competition with him. This does not mean necessarily that
the volume of such a purchaser must be segregated into wholesale and
retail and that wholesale and retail discounts, respectively, must be
granted only in respect of such segregated volumes since the law is not
concerned with any formula but only with the final criterion as to
whether or not a probability of injury to competition results. Sales
Ioo. Section 2 (a) of the Act, first proviso, says:
" ...
nothing contained in sections 12, 13, 14-21, 22-27 of this title shall prevent' differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost of

manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in
which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered."
For a further discussion of functional discounts see: Standard Oil Co., F. T. C.
No. 4389 (Dec. IO, 1945) ; 22 WASHa. U. L. Q. 153. Also United States Quary Tile
Co., 32 F. T. C. 1652 (194); Superior Ceramic Corp., 32 F. T. C. 1652 (1941);
Mosaic Tile Co., 32 F. T. C. 1653 (1941) ; Pardee Matawan Tile Co., 32 F. T. C. 1654
(1941); Wenczel Tile Co., 32 F. T. C. 1654 (1941); Wheeling Tile Co., 32 F. T. C.

1655 (941)

; Architectural Tiling Co.,

Inc., 32 F. T. C. 1656 (1941).

32

F. T. C. 1655 (941)

; National Tile Co..
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to wholesalers who do a substantial retail volume, therefore, may be
safely handled in any one of three ways.
First, such a purchaser's volume might be divided into wholesale
and retail and the same basic discount granted to him on all his purchases together with an overriding wholesale discount on those of his
purchases resold at wholesale. While this would perhaps best satisfy
the Act from a technical standpoint, actually it will usually be found
difficult to administer even though the seller will evidently be required
to exert only a reasonable effort to police the system. 101 The seller
might require the purchaser to submit at given intervals certified copies
of his wholesale and retail volume, but expense, delay, and trouble
would undoubtedly be encountered in checking the statements of the
purchaser and, in addition, human nature being what it is, the purchaser might well be tempted for profit reasons to err in submitting
figures on his wholesale volume. The necessity of resorting to this
method in order to compensate the purchaser for the use made of commodities purchased was criticized by Commissioner Mason in a novel
and startling dissent in the StandardOil case, 10 2 but nevertheless meets
with Federal Trade Commission approval as represented by the majority opinion in the same case.
Secondly, the purchaser might set up two separate corporate enterprises, one substantially a wholesaler, the other substantially a retailer,
and the seller might give to each its respective functional discount.
Since the Act requires as a condition to violation thereof that there be
two competitive purchasers from the same seller,' 0 3 no violation apparently could exist in this type of situation since the wholesale corporation would not be in competition with retailers engaged in competition with the purchaser's retail corporation. Even if the purchaser did
not go so far, however, as to set up separate corporate enterprises, but
merely set up different operating divisions of its business, one to handle
wholesale and one to handle retail, probably the purchaser and seller
would also avoid violation of the Act since in that event the parties
would be acting essentially in accordance with the first method of
approach to the problem.
Thirdly, instead of giving the purchaser a large enough discount
on his purchases for resale at wholesale to take care of his expenses in
ioi. Standard Oil Co., F. T. C. No. 4389 (Dec. 10, 1945).
1o2. Ibid.
103. See consideration, supra, at 30, of the requirement under § 2 (a) of the Act
that there must be two purchasers from the same seller. In view of the government's
arguments in the A. & P. case, in regard to the establishment of separate corporations
to avoid the impact of the Robinson-Patman Act, some attack on the practice here discussed might be anticipated of course.
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connection therewith, plus a reasonable profit, it would appear that the
seller might give to such a purchaser a flat discount in a lesser amount
on all his purchases whether subsequently resold by him at wholesale
or retail. By thus averaging the over-all discounts, the purchaser would
be put in the same position as if a preferential discount were given to
him on his "wholesale purchases" only, and a retail discount given to
him on his "retail purchases." This is probably the most practical
approach to satisfying the requirements of the Act. It necessarily involves, of course, setting up some requirements to be- complied with by
the purchaser so that the average price granted to him on his purchases
will result in a fair averaging of prices to him on his over-all business
as compared with other purchasers doing solely a wholesale or solely a
retail business. For example, the purchaser may be required to do a
certain percentage of business at wholesale and may be required to
maintain wholesale facilities and carry out the functions of a true wholesaler. The establishment of specific requirements along the foregoing
lines will be desirable to remove the possibility of any charge that the
special discounts given by the seller are unrelated to costs of the seller
or of the buyer. It is quite clear from the position that Commissioner
Mason took in his dissenting opinion in the Standard Oil Company
-case-which in this respect is reconcilable with the majority opinionthat this approach to the wholesale discount problem in the case of a
wholesaler doing a retail busiliess will meet with Federal Trade Commission approval. 10 4
OTHER EXEMPT PRACTICES

In addition to permissible price differences that may exist in respect to quantity discounts and functional discounts certain other price
differences to customers are also permissible under the Act. Sales at
special prices to the Government are unobjectionable since the Government is not a competitive customer. 10 5 Sales by a seller to a branch
store are exempt since there is no "purchase" or "sale" involved. 10 6
Sales for final consumption by retail customers are exempt because retail customers are not in competition with one another commercially;
1O4. In the Standard Oil case the Standard Oil Company classified four of its customers as jobbers, although it did not require them to perform any jobber functions.
Attempting to defend the preferential prices given to these customers, the Standard Oil
Company sought to impute cost savings to its manner of dealing with these customers
as compared with other customers, but such imputations of cost savings were found to

be without foundation in fact.

5105
General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598
(W. D. Ky. 194), aff'd., 132 F. (2d) 425 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S.

780 (1943).
io6. Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 131 F. (2d) 674 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
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sporadic sales as distinguished from regular sales of a given commodity
are for the same reason also exempt: 107
"The Act . . . applies to commercial sales on the part of those

who deal in the commodity under considerationto purchasers from
a seller."
However, the Act does cover sales to two or more purchasers of
a commodity used or consumed by purchasers in or in connection with
the manufacture or processing of an end product which is sold by them
in competition with one another. Thus, in Van Camp & Sons v.
American Can Co.,108 and American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning
Co., ' the cans involved were not resold by the canning companies, but
were used in connection with the sale of other items. In the Corn
Productscase and in the Staley Mfg. Co. case, glucose, the commodity
involved, was not resold by the competitive purchasers but was used
by them as an ingredient in the products manufactured by them and in
turn resold in competition.
SECTIONS 2 (c),

2 (D)

AND 2 (E)

Discriminations forbidden by the Robinson-Patman Act, as observed at the outset, are of two types: first, the general acts of price
discrimination whose illegality is dependent on their probable injurious
effect on competition-these are forbidden by Section 2 (a); second,
specific acts which Congress has adjudged to be inevitably injurious to
competition-these are forbidden by Sections 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (e).
Section 2 (c) of the Act prohibits a seller from paying fictitious
brokerage fees either directly or indirectly to the buyer or to the buyer's
agent or intermediary. The receipt of such fictitious brokerage payments is likewise prohibited by the Section. 1 0
Section 2 (d) I" prohibits discriminatory payment to a buyer for
services and facilities furnished by such buyer where comparable, proportionate payment is not made or offered to another buyer for similar services.

Section 2 (e)

112

complements Section 2 (d) in pro-

hibiting a seller from furnishing discriminatory services to a buyer.
1O7. General Shale Products Corp. v. Struck Construction Co., 37 F. Supp. 598,
602 (W. D. Ky. 1941).
io8. 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
iog. 44 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o). These cases, while decided prior to the
amendment of Section 2 of the Clayton Act by the Robinson-Patman Act, were based
upon comparable language in the old section.
n1o. For language of Section 2 (c), see note ii, supra.
iii. For language of Section 2 (d), see note 12, supra.
112. For language of Section 2 (e), see note 13, supra.
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These three subdivisions of the Act have in common the fact that
they are applicable to all sales in foreign or interstate commerce. In
this respect they are similar to Section 2 (a) of the Act. Unlike Section 2 (a), however, these sections evidently apply to all sales in foreign or interstate commerce, regardless of whether or not the commodities involved are "sold for use, consumption or resale in the United
States," since the quoted language which appears in Section 2 (a) does
not appear in these sections. Actually, it is to be noted, there is no
reference in Section 2 (e) whatever to the type of commerce involved,
as is true with respect to the other pections of the Act, and for this
reason Section 2 (e) has been attacked, although unsuccessfully, as un113
constitutional.
Sections 2 (c), 2 (d), and 2 (e) are alike also in that the acts

prohibited thereby are inherently illegal by decree of Congress, regardless of effect on competition.
Section 2 (c) was enacted to prohibit the unethical practice of
forcing a seller to pay a brokerage fee to a broker designated by the
buyer and the practice of having a broker divide his allegiance between
the two parties to a contract."' Accordingly, fictitious brokerage fees
of any kind are absolutely proscribed on the basis that they are inherently injurious to the free flow of commerce and, therefore, unlaw115

ful per se.

The same illegality per se exists with regard to the acts condemned
by Sections 2 (d) and (e). In Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade
Comm.,1

6

the court said regarding these sections:

"It is perfectly clear that all three of these practices were forbidden
because of their tendency to lessen competition and create monopoly, without regard to their effect in a particular case; and there is
no reason to read into the sections forbidding them the limitations contained in Section 2 (a) having relation to price discrimination, which is an extremely difficult matter to deal with and is
condemned as unfair only in those cases where it has an effect'
113. E. Arden, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, r56 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 2d,
1946) ; Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., i5o F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 8th,
1945).

114. Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Comm., 102 F. (2d) 763 (C. C. -A. 4th, 1939);
Bayly, Four Years Under the Robinson-PatinanAct (1941) 25 MINN. L. REV. 131.
115. Southgate Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., i5o F. (2d) 607 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1945); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 166 F.
(2d) 667 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939), cert. denied, 308 U. S. 625 (940), rehearing denied, 309
U. S. 694 (194o); Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Comm., 114 F. (2d)
393 (C. C. A. ist, 194o) ; Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Comm., imO F. (2d) 763 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1939) ; Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 96 F. (d) 687 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 634 (1938); Kentucky-Tennessee Light &
Power Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 37 F. Supp. (W. D. Ky. 1941).
116. 1o2 F. (2d) 763, 767 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
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in suppressing competition or in tending to create monopoly. The
forbidding of specific practices because of their tendency toward
a general result, also forbidden, is familiar legislative practice;
and no reason suggests itself why the limitations and provisions
relating to one should be read into those relating to the other." 117
Paradoxically, however, competitive practices are a possible defense to a violation of Section 2 (e) as is true of Section 2 (a), although not a defense to a violation of Section 2 (c) or 2 (d). This
situation is considered in connection with Section 2 (b) of the Act,
infra.
A third feature of similarity in the three Sections under consideration is the fact that indirect as well as direct violations of the Sections are prohibited. Thus, Section 2 (c) specifically prohibits fictitious brokerage payments by a seller not only to a buyer, but also
to the buyer's agent or any person under the buyer's control. Interpreting the prohibition in accordance with its spirit, the courts have
stated that any payment of compensation by a seller to an agent or
representative of the buyer is prohibited and unlawful whether the
agent in receiving the commissions is acting in the transaction "in
behalf of the buyer or merely for his own pocket" 18 and that a
broker who places the orders of a buyer at the most advantageous
prices from the standpoint of the buyer and otherwise acts on behalf
of the buyer may not accept any brokerage fee from a seller, even
though the buyer pays him no fee, if other buyers have to pay fees to
brokers for similar services; 119 and that no broker who owes any
allegiance to a buyer can accept any type of brokerage fee from the
seller, even though he performs some services for the seller and would
otherwise appear to be entitled to compensation within the apparent
exception specified in Section 2 (C), to wit:
"It shall be unlawful .

.

. to

pay . . . or to receive .

anything of value as a commission, brokerage or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu thereof, except for
services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of goods,
wares or merchandise." (Italics ours.)
117. To the same effect are the following: Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal

Trade Comm,, 324 U. S. 726, 746 (1945), 144 F.(2d) 211, 215 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944);

Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., i~o F. (2d) 6o7 (C. C. A. 4th,
1945) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., io6 F. (2d) 667 (C.
C. A. 3d, 1939), cert denied, 308 U. S. 625 (1940) ; Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade

Comm., cited supra note 116; Biddle Purchasing Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 96
F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 634.
118. Fitch v. Kentuky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F. (2d) 12, I5 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1943).
119. Federal Trade Comm. v. Herzog, 15o F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945) ; see

also Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 149 F. (2d) 970
(C. C. A. 7th, 1945).
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For no true services sufficient to constitute a legal obligation or the
basis of a moral obligation can be rendered by a broker except to the
120
person who has engaged him or to whom he owes his first allegiance.
This is sound business ethics as well as sound law.
The most recent and striking recognition of this fact is seen in the
A & P case in which -the court found that A & P and its allied defendants were guilty of restraining trade and monopolizing a substantial part of the interstate trade and commerce in food due primarily to the unlawful brokerage activities of its wholly-owned subsidiary, ACCO, the Alantic Commission Company. ACCO at once
acted as selling agent for certain produce suppliers, as purchasing agent
for A & P, and as buying broker for certain competitors of A & P
and used its inconsistent positions to the advantage of A & P and
the detriment of others. Said the court: 121
"The conduct of ACCO is the rotten thread of the fabric and it
so permeates the entire texture and ties together the other threads
as to result in an imperfect, an illegal product-unreasonable interference with competition and power to monopolize."
While Sections 2 (d) and 2 (e) have not received the extensive
consideration of courts that Section 2 (c) has received, it is, nevertheless, clear from the specific language of those sections that in an
appropriate case the courts would go to similar lengths in prohibiting
indirect violations of the Sections. Section 2 (d), for example, prohibits discriminatory payment for services either to the buyer or in
any way that is beneficial to the buyer.' 22 It is applicable also not
only to a sale and resale of a product in its original state, but in any
modified state, siAce the Act specifically proscribes payment for facilities "in connection with the processing, handling, sale or offering for
sale." 123 While the language of Section 2 (e) is not as detailed in
this regard, the same limitations may reasonably be inferred since the
Section is essentially complementary to Section 2 (e) and has been so
interpreted.1

24

12o. Southgate Brokerage Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 15o F. (2d) 6o7, 6o9 (C.
C. A. 4th, 1945) ; Modern Marketing Service, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 149 F. (2d
970, 978 (C. C. A. 7th, 1945) ; Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Comm.,
114 F. (2d) 393, 399 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940) ; Webb-Crawford Co. v. Federal Trade
Comm., xo9 F. (2d) 268, 27o (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.

v. Federal Trade Comm., io6 F. (2d) 667, 674 (C. C. A. 3d, X939) ; Oliver Bros., Inc.
v. Federal Trade Comm., 102 F. (2d) 763, 770 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
121. Cited supra note 3.
122. Section 2 (d) in this connection reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce to pay or contract for the payment of anything of value to or for
the benefit of a customer of such person. . . ." (Italics ours.)
123. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324 U. S. 726,
744 (1945).
124. In Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 15o F. (2d) 988, 99o (C.
C. A. 8th, 1945), where a seller engaged in interstate commerce arbitrarily furnished
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In view of the clear and sweeping prohibitions of Section 2 (c) and
the interpretations thereof by the courts, there is no real problem for
the businessman in determining what steps he must take to be in compliance with the section: Under no circumstances can a broker be
granted or accept anything in the nature 6f a fee from one party to
a sales transaction when he owes allegiance to the other party.1 25 In
respect to Section 2 (d) and 2 (e), however, some further consideration of possible guides may be necessary, since the businessman will
desire to know precisely what he must do to have his advertising practices in conformity with the law.
While Section 2 (d) of the Act was enacted chiefly to stop discriminatory advertising practices, e. g., the practice of a seller paying
one buyer for advertising, demonstrating or displaying his products
while offering no comparable and proportionate payment to another
buyer for similar services, the Section is not so limited by its language,
but applies to discriminatory practices in the nature of sales promotion.' 26 And in keeping with this broad purpose, Section 2 (d) condemns not only an actual discriminatory payment in connection with
sales promotion but even a contract for the granting of a discriminatory
payment since the section provides that "it shall be unlawful for any
In other
, 127
1.
person . . to pay or contract for the payment
words, such a contract is void and illegal per se. Hence, it is not enforceable and the parties to it are subject to the penalties provided by
the Act.
Certain helpful guides were laid down by the court in Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp v. Gus Blass Co.,' 2 s and more recently in E. Arden

Inc. v. FederalTrade Comm.,' 2 9 to assist the business man in determining whether he was giving or offering his customers proper advertising
clerks' services or salaries in unequal amounts to customers competing in distribution
of its products, the court said:
"The situation probably might alternatively have been regarded as a discriminatory payment of compensation by appellant for special clerks' services or facilities furnished by Cohn Co. and by appellee in demonstrating or pushing the sale
of appellant's products instead of as a furnishing of clerks' services or facilities
by appellant to Cohn Co. and to appellee and so to constitute a violation of Section 2 (d)of the Clayton Act as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act . .
(and at page 993) "We may further add that even if subsection (e) had been
invalid, we would not for that reason have reversed the judgment because as we
have previously indicated, the situation could just as properly on the evidence
have been treated as a violation of subse&ion (d)-a fact which appellant does
not dispute-and this would be sufficient to permit us to affirm the judgment it
there is no merit in appellant's remaining contentions hereafter to be considered."
125. P. 335, supra.

126. Southgate Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, I5o F. (2d) 6o7,
611 (C.C.A. 4th, i945).
127. Italics are the writer's.
128. 1So F. (2d) 988 (C.C. A. 8th, 1945).
129. 156 F. (2d) 132 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946).
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and sales promotional allowances as required under the Act. In the
first Arden case, the court indicated that the advertising or similar allowances granted to customers should bear a direct relationship to the
actual volume of purchases by such customers from the seller during the
same calendar or fiscal year or other specified period of time; that the
amount of the advertising allowance should be related to purchases by
use of quantity brackets fixed prior to the time the purchases were
made; in addition, that the facilities provided or to be provided by the
buyer should be specifically scheduled; that the provisions on which the
advertising allowances were offered should be fixed and made known
prior to the effective date of the allowances and prior to the time purchases were made rather than tailored on a post-factum basis to suit the
situation of a preferred buyer; that while a difference in the more ample
facilities of one customer as compared with those of another might jus-"
tify a corresponding difference in allowances, each customer would have
to be given the same actual opportunity to qualify for proportionate
allowances.
In .a final sweeping warning to sellers who felt that they could
not abide by the rules applicable to the determination of advertising
allowances, the circuit court in Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus
Blass Co. 130 said:

"The furnishing of a service or facility which cannot be proportionalized for the benefit of competing purchasers or, in the alternative, the failure or refusal to proportionalize the terms upon
which services or facilities are granted, so as to make it reasonably possible for competing purchasers to avail themselves of such
services or facilities if they desire to do so, constitutes .a failure
to accord such services or facilities upon proportionally equal
terms."
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the second
Arden case adopted the conclusions of the Eighth Circuit Court in the
Arden v. Gus Blass 131 opinion and applying the quoted language of the
court in that case specifically condemned the Arden Company for setting up conditions for receipt of special sales promotional allowances,
which it knew only a small number of its purchasers could meet.
In the recent A & P case, the court laid down additional guides
for the determination of proper advertising allowances. Such allowances, the court warned, must not be based merely on the purchaser's
volume, but on the definite and enforceable commitment by the purchaser to carry out certain prescribed advertising activities and on
988, 994 (C. C. A. 8t, 1945).
131. 156 F. (2d) 132, 133 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
130. 15o F. (2d)
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proof, before payment of the allowances, of the performance of such activities. Otherwise the allowances for advertising would most likely
be mere subterfuges for preferential payments to the buyer.
SECTION 2 (F)

While Section 2 (f) of the Act prohibits the receipt of any price
discrimination, whether forbidden by Section 2 (a), (d), or (e), 132
the buyer not uncommonly will seek to escape its impact on the ground
that the section makes it unlawful for the buyer only knowingly to
induce or receive a discrimination. In the quantity discount contracts
with A & P, for example, A & P required the manufacturer to state
that it was willing to make "the same agreement .

.

.

with any other

purchaser similarly situated on proportionately equal terms" and after
the Third Circuit Court upheld the Federal Trade Commission's condemnation of A & P's unlawful brokerage practices in 1939, supra, the
A & P had its suppliers change the contract provision to read: 133
"The seller warrants that the quantity discount . . does not re-

flect any brokerage or brokerage savings whatsoever, and is available on proportionally equal terms to all other buyers, after making
due allowances for differences in the seller's cost (other than
brokerage) and for the seller's right to select his customers or to
change his prices in response to market conditions or to meet
competitors' prices."
In the recent A & P decision, however,13 4 the court said: "I have not
been greatly interested in what either defendants or suppliers said in
this respect. I am essentially interested in what they did, and .
it seems to me that, though defendants have been careful to sectire
from their vendors avowals of compliance with the Robinson-Patman
Act, they have been far from meticulous in acceptance of preferences
which, under the facts and circumstances they knew or should have
known other purchasers did not receive and that they so acted as to
secure preferential discounts either under that term or other terms
resulting in an unfair competitive advantage."
On the other hand, the situation that obtained in the A & P case
will not be generally true in some industries, particularly in the many
production industries where large suppliers ordinarily keep secret the
132. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., io6 F. (2d) 667
(C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Oliver Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 102 F. (2d) 763
(C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
133. United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co.. 67 F. Supp. 627, 648

(E. D. Ill. 1946).

134. 67 F. Supp. 626, 649 (E. D. Ill. 1946).
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prices charged to their various competitive customers and where the
customers likewise regard as highly secret the prices they so obtain.
In the final analysis, of course, the rule laid down by Judge Lindley
would prevail in all cases, namely, if the favored purchaser knows
or should know that other competitive purchasers are paying lower
prices, he will be charged with knowledge that the prices granted to
him may be discriminatory. 135
SECTION 2

(B)

Section 2 (b) of the Act consists of two parts. The first part
places the burden upon a defendant to justify his position once it has
been shown that the defendant is a party to a price discrimination. This
is an application of the practice of shifting the burden of proof which,
in turn, is based on the principle that a defendant who relies on an
exception to the prohibition of a statute must plead and prove that
he comes within the exception. The act in this respect is, therefore,
not novel, but is a common practice in legal procedure. 13 In fact, the
rule of shifting the burden of proof apparently was recognized as a rule
of evidence, even under Section 2 of the Clayton Act prior to amend13 7
ment. American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co.

The latter part of Section 2 (b) deals with the availability of the
defense of competition where a violation of the Act is involved, and is
of very considerable interest to the businessman who usually feels that
he-is always justified in adopting a pricing practice that places him in
an equal position with competition.
First of all, it should be observed that the defense of competition
has been held to. be available only where the charge against the defendant is a type of price discrimination foibidden by Section 2 (a) or
where the charge is that the defendant has discriminatorily furnished
services or facilities contrary to Section 2 (e). The defense of competition has been deemed not to be available where the charge involved
is payment of a fictitious brokerage fee contrary to Section 2 (c) or dis135. Cf., however, Section 2 (c) in this connection which reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . to pay or grant, or to receive or accept anything of
value. . . ." (Italics ours.)
136. Concerning this provision, BEER, FEDERAL TRADE LAW AND PRACTICE (1942)
states at page 115:
"Section 2 (b) does not change the substantive offense under those subdivisions, but merely places the burden of proving justification for a difference in
the treatment of different customers upon respondent. Shifting the burden of such
proof to the defending party is a device familiar to lawyers, and this provision of
the statute is similar to the general rule of statutory construction that a proviso
carves special exceptions out of a statute and he who relies on the exception must
plead and prove it."
137. 44 F. (2d) 763, 768 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
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criminatory payment for services or facilities contrary to Section 2 (d).
In Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm. the court thus
stated the point: 131
"The language of paragraph (b) relates to proceedings brought
pursuant to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (e) but is not
applicable to proceedings instituted under paragraphs (c) or (d)."
It is seemingly incongruous, of course, as previously mentioned
(page 335, supra) that competitive practices should be available as a
defense under Section 2 (b) to a violation of Section 2 (e), while not
available as a defense to a violation of Section 2 (d). For injury to
competition need not be shown for proof by an injured party or the
Federal Trade Commission of a violation either of Section 2 (e) or
2 (d) (page 334, supra) ; and Section 2 (e) has been deemed to be in
the nature of an interchangeable provision with and complementary
to Section 2 (d).'
The courts have not yet considered this seeming
contradiction nor decided to what extent competitive practices may
constitute a defense under Section 2 (b) to a violation of Section 2 (e).
It may be ventured, however, that competitive practices are and logically
should be a possible defense to a seller's payment for preferential services (Section 2 (d)) just as well as to the furnishing of such services
(Section 2 (e)). The language of Section 2 (b) seems to be broad
enough to support this conclusion when it says that the respondent may
justify his practices:
"by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor or the services or
facilities furnished by a competitor."
For the reference to price in Section 2 (b) may properly relate to a violation of Section 2 (d) which prohibits discriminatory payment for
services, a practice which certainly is in the nature of a price discrimination and has been so interpreted in connection with the prohibition
against receipt of any discriminationin price under Section 2 (f). 14
The fact that Section 2 (b) permits the use of competitive practices as a defense only with respect to violations of certain sections of
the Act does not in any event, however, render Section 2 (b) unconstitutional as at first blush it was deemed to be in some quarters.
138. lo6 F. (2d) 667, 677 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
139. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 15o F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 8th,
1945).
140. See p. 333, supra; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.,
io6 F. (2d) 667, 677 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) ; Oliver Bros. v. Federal Trade Comm., io2
F. (2d) 763, 767 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
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Even with respect to discriminations forbidden by Sections 2 (a)
and 2 (e), competition is not an absolute defense.' 41 A price discrimination, even though indulged in by some competitors, may injure one
or more other competitors who do not indulge in it. To hold a price
discrimination not to be illegal under the circumstances would be to
arrive at the inconsistent position of approving one illegal practice be142
cause it was indulged in so as to meet a similar illegal practice.
However, it will be observed that if all or substantially all competitors
engage in a certain practice, it ceases to be a discrimination effecting
an injury to competition.
Whether competitive practices constitute a defense to a particular
discrimination is, therefore, a question of fact to be resolved by the
143
proof elicited in each case.
Certain guides, nevertheless, are helpful in determining the availability of competitive practices as a defense to violation of Sections 2
(a) and 2 (e). Primarily, it should be borne in mind that a justification on competitive grounds of a practice otherwise violative of Section 2 (a) or 2 (e) is defensive in character. 1 44 As already indicated,
therefore, a seller cannot indulge in price discriminations on a widespread basis in violation of the Act merely on the ground that competition is doing likewise. He can give a lower price only to a customer
or customers in a local area in order to meet a particular local competitive situation in that area. He cannot, for example, give one chain
store buyer a discriminatory price all over the country when the seller's
45
competitors give such price to the same buyer in only one locality.'
Likewise, therefore, if a discriminatory seller meets a specific discriminatory price of a competitor in an area where he himself sets the
general price pattern, he probably will not be absolved. Neither will a
seller be absolved if he carries a discrimination further than his competitors since properly he is justified only in meeting competitive prices
and payments for special services, not beating them. 146 By force of
the same reasoning, a defendant must show that he lowered prices to
meet competition, not that he adopted higher competitive prices. And,
at the same time, the fact that the seller's discriminatory prices are
141. 80 CONG. REc. 9418 (1936).

142. The Supreme Court in the Staley case, cited supra note 57, said it was:
. . . the clear Congressionalpurpose not to sanction by Section 2 (b) the
excuse that the person charged with a Violation of the law was merely adopting a
similarly ilawful practice of another." (Italia ours.)
143. Federal Trade Commission v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U. S. 746, 752-753
(1945).

x44. Standard Brands, Inc., 29 F. T. C. 121 (1939); BEER, FEDERAL TRADE LAW
AND PRACTICE (1942) 117.
145. 8O CONG. REc. 9418 (1936).

146. Shefford Cheese Co., Inc., 25 F. T. C. 1209 (1937) ; BEER, FEDERAL TRADE
LAW AND PRACTICE (1942)

118.
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lower than those he might have charged on a non-discriminatory basis,
is, of itself, no defense under Section 2 (b). 147
In this connection it is helpful for the seller, however, to keep in
mind as a guide that if he can show that his lower prices in a particular
instance were not below the prices of his competitors, but merely met
their equally low prices, he can justify his position; '1 that, on the
other hand, even if he sells below the prices of a competitor, his action
is defensible if he can prove that his lower prices did not prevent or
tend to prevent the competitor from obtaining the otherwise available
business, since in such event the price-cutting seller would not come
149
within the terms of the statute at all.
Since resort to and reliance on competitive practices is a defensive
measure as thus illustrated, it is natural that the Act requires the seller
to show that he has acted in good faith in relying on competitive practices in engaging in discriminatory practices. The seller's good faith,
like the matter of competitive practices itself, is a question of fact.""0
Specific and detailed proof of competitive practices and the necessity of meeting them must be adduced by a seller charged with price
discrimination who attempts to justify his action on the basis of his
efforts in good faith to meet competition pursuant to Section 2 (b) of
the Act. From the admonition of the Supreme Court, it may be concluded that the seller's representatives or other persons must be in a
position to testify or produce written proof that the lower prices which
the seller allegedly met were actually given to specific purchasers in
particular instances by competitors of the seller. The seller must also
have knowledge of the character and reliability of his representatives
or the sources of information upon which he relied, and certainly cannot rely on any source of information which he suspects of being false
or incorrect.
In brief, the seller's aim under the Act must be always to give
equal price treatment to all his customers, large and small. This is not
only sound law; in the long run, it will also be found to be sound business since competition, which is the life of trade, depends essentially
on equality of economic opportunity to all. At the present stage of industrial reconversion, it is opportune to rectify business practices accordingly.'"'
147. Staley v. Federal Trade Comm., cited supra note 57.
148. Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 148 F. (2d) 378, 379 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1945).
149. Section 2 (a) requires that there be probability of injury to competition or a

competitor or a tendency to create a monopoly.
i5o. Staley v. Federal Trade Comm., cited sipra note 57.

151. See remarks of Attorney-General Tom C.' Clark in Clark, New Basing-Point

Problems (1945) HARv. Bus. REv. II0-III.

